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INTRODUCTION
For nearly two decades, two U.S. statutes have provided redress to
victims of human rights abuses: the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture
Victim Protection Act. A handful of plaintiffs have recovered under
these laws against foreign perpetrators of a narrow range of human
rights violations.
The growth and proliferation of communications technology raises
important questions about how these statutes will be used in the future.
Human rights activists have discovered that they can instantly commu-
nicate over the Internet with supporters and news media anywhere in the
world. Repressive regimes have responded by attempting to restrict such
communications. Could cutting an activist's access to the Internet give
rise to a human rights claim in U.S. courts? No one has yet sued under
the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act as a result of
disrupted Internet access, but such litigation is foreseeable as the Inter-
net is increasingly used for human rights reporting.
I submit that these statutes can provide the means of bringing suits
against individuals or foreign states which suppress reports on torture
sent over the Internet. Part II of this note lays the foundation for this
argument by briefly examining the Alien Tort Statute. This law creates a
cause of action in U.S. district courts for violations of those human
rights which are part of the "law of nations." Part IlI demonstrates that
the law of nations encompasses a right to freedom of information con-
cerning information on acts of torture, and that any violation of this
right should be actionable. Part M also explores choice of law and dam-
ages issues faced by human rights claimants. Part IV explains how
suppressing Internet reports on torture can constitute complicity in tor-
ture, providing a second basis for a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Statute, as amended by the Torture Victim Protection Act. Part V ex-
amines additional barriers confronting torture victim claimants:
sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and the political question
doctrine. Part VI discusses the need for legislative reform to ensure that
meritorious claims for violations of the freedom of information and the
prohibition on torture can be brought in federal court.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNET
The Internet is a world-wide computer network consisting of thou-
sands of individual computers located at universities, businesses, and
homes. Scientists and computer hobbyists have used the Internet on a
small scale for almost a decade. Use of the Internet has increased
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greatly in recent years, however, as people have realized it is a powerful
means of communication. Using the Internet, an individual can send
vast amounts of information anywhere in the world instantaneously,
with little more than a personal computer, a modem, and a telephone
line.' People can send e-mail, documents, pictures, and even digitized
sounds to other indivudual users or groups of users anywhere on the
network. As many as 40 million users are linked to the Internet world-
wide.2
The potential power of this information technology is staggering.
One commentator has pointed out that during the early days of the Ira-
nian revolution, the Ayatollah Khoemeni distributed his messages
throughout Iran on cassette tapes, a slow process which reached limited
3
numbers of people but was ultimately effective. How much more
quickly would the Shah's regime have collapsed if Khoemeni could
have used the Internet to carry his messages from his home in France to
thousands of locations in Iran simultaneously?
When the Zapatista rebels launched their rebellion in Mexico in
1994, they used the Internet to distribute their message world-wide.
The rebel leader, "Marcos," wrote his communiqu6s on a laptop com-
puter, powered by a plug in the cigarette lighter of his pickup truck . In
the former Yugoslavia, computer users have established their own com-
puter network, maintaining a communications link with the rest of the
world. Reports of beatings of imprisoned activists have been circulated
internationally, and Bosnians in the United States have used e-mail to
search for lost relatives.6
Amnesty International USA has a special office devoted to report-
ing on torture, pending executions, and other life-threatening situations.
The office is run from one person's home in Colorado, but it reaches
people all over the world. Amnesty claims that it can report an arrest so
quickly over the Internet that an appeal can sometimes be around the
1. One journalist pointed out that two "hardworking 25-year-old computer science
graduates, with $50,000 in hardware and software and little help from outsiders" linked the
country of Iran to the rest of the world via the Internet. Carroll Bogert, Chat rooms and
chadors, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1995, at 36.
2. See Scott Maier, Taking the Front Line Online; Pleas from A War-Torn Land Reach
World Via PC Networks, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 29, 1995, at Al.
3. See Eugene T. Rossides, Comments at the International Law Society and the Feder-
alist Society's panel discussion "The Rule of Law, Human Rights, and 'The New World
Order,"' University of Michigan Law School (Mar. 19, 1996).
4. See Tod Robberson, Mexican Rebels Using A High-Tech Weapon; Internet Helps
Rally Support, WASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al.
5. See id.
6. See Maier, supra note 2.
7. Seeid.atAlO.
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world before the prisoner reaches the police station.8 Another organiza-
tion, the Digital Freedom Network, uses the Internet to circulate
materials outlawed in the authors' home countries.9
Governments have been scrambling to keep up with activists, 0 and
clashes with human rights organizations have already occurred. In
Mexico, organizations have complained that their offices have been ran-
sacked and their telephone lines disrupted." In Singapore, the
government introduced what it called "anti-pollution measures" regu-
lating use of the Internet and requiring all organizations posting
religious or political information to register with the broadcasting
authority.' 2 The telecommunications ministry in Iran cut all the tele-
phone lines of one Internet access provider in August 1995, allegedly to
restrict access to pornography. 3 The Chinese Post and Telecommunica-
tions Minister recently stated that China would take steps to prevent
"politically dangerous" ideas from being transmitted over the Internet.
4
The government of Myanmar has expressed concern about the cyber-
space activities of dissidents, 15 and Vietnam announced the takeover of
the country's Internet connection in order to protect "culture and na-
tional security."'16 The Internet has thus emerged as a new front in the
struggle between governments and human rights activists.
Human rights law must evolve to meet the challenges of this new
technology. For almost two decades, it has been possible to bring tort
claims in U.S. federal courts for violations of the customary interna-
tional law against torture occurring outside the United States. Human
rights advocates are increasingly using the Internet to report on torture,
and as foreign government officials take steps to prevent such reporting,
litigation seems inevitable. Congress and the courts will have to be pre-
pared to respond to these developments.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See John Perry Barlow, Thinking Locally, Acting Globally, TNm, Jan. 15, 1996, at
76 ("[N]ation-states are rushing to get their levers of control into cyberspace while less than
1% of the world's population is online.").
11. See Robberson, supra note 4.
12. See Not too modem please: Asia and the Internet, THE ECONOMIST, March 16,
1996, at 42,43.
13. See Bogert, supra note 1.
14. Invasion from cyberspace. China's new age, WoRLD PREss REVmw, March 1996, at
40.
15. See Not too modem please, supra note 12.
16. Politics and Current Affairs, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1995, at 4.
17. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, infra notes 21-22, and accompanying text.
The Law of Nations in Cyberspace
I1. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Persons responsible for acts of torture in foreign states can be sued
in federal court by their individual victims under two statutes: the Alien
Tort Statute18 and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. '9 The
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) grants district courts "original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States., 20 The ATS was little
known and rarely invoked' until 1980, when it provided the basis for
22the landmark case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
A. Filargtiga v. Pena-Irala
The Filartiga plaintiffs, Joel Filartiga and his daughter, Dolly, were
Paraguayan citizens residing in Washington, DC. They sued Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala, a former Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay, whom they discovered residing in New York. The Filartigas
claimed that Pena had been responsible for the torture and murder of
Joelito Filartiga, Joel's son, in a Paraguayan police station. The plain-
tiffs sought $10,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages,
alleging their cause of action arose "under 'wrongful death statutes; the
U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the U.N.
Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and
practices constituting the customary international law of human rights
and the law of nations,' as well as [the ATS] and the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.' '23
18. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 (1789). The current version of the Alien Tort
Statute appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. IV 1992). Note that a person must be acting "under actual
or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation." See discussion infra pp. 24-28.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
21. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). See also lT v. Ven-
cap, 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)(Friendly, J.), where Judge Friendly described the ATS as
"kind of legal Lohengrin... no one seems to know whence it came." Id. at 1015. Lohengrin
is a mythical knight in Wagner's opera Lohengrin, who declares to his beloved: "Elsa, soil
ich dein Gatte heissen. Soil Land und Leut' ich schirmen dir .... Musst eines du geloben
mir: Nie soilst du mich befragen, noch Wissens Sorge tragen, woher ich kam der Fahrt, noch
wie mein Nam' und Art!" ("Elsa, should I become thy husband, should nought the ties that
bind us break,... one promise, Elsa, must thou make. These questions ask me never, nor
think upon them ever: from whence I hither came, what is my rank or name!") RICHARD
WAGNER, LoHENGRIN 62-64 (Arthur Sullivan et al. eds & John Oxenford trans., Boosey &.
Co. 1897).
22. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. Id. at 878 (quoting Complaint).
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The United States at that time had not ratified a treaty prohibiting
torture, so the plaintiffs alleged federal court jurisdiction under the ATS
by demonstrating that torture is forbidden under the law of nations.
Congress subsequently enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) which provides a separate statutory basis for a cause of action
in district court against individual torturers2 and endorses the view that
torture is a violation of international customary law and that such a
violation is actionable in federal court.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
26jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the determi-
native question was whether Pena's alleged conduct violated the law of
nations.27 If it indeed violated the law of nations, the statute conferred
jurisdiction upon the court and the case could proceed.
The Court of Appeals relied on the preeminent American case on
customary international law, The Paquete Habana, which held that the
traditional prohibition against seizure of an enemy's coastal fishing ves-
sels had evolved from a standard of comity into a settled rule of
international law.2 This holding echoed earlier cases establishing that
customary international law is binding on the United States. Early in
the Nineteenth Century in The Nereide, Chief Justice John Marshall
wrote that U.S. courts are "bound by the law of nations, which is a part
of the law of the land."30 In The Charming Betsy, the Chief Justice es-
tablished the rule of statutory interpretation that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains ....
In The Paquete Habana, the Court instructed that "the customs and
usages of civilized nations" are binding even in the absence of a treaty
32
or other international agreement. The Court opined that a state practice
may become "a settled rule of international law" by the "general assent
of civilized nations. 33 This statement has subsequently been understood
24. See id. at 878.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. IV 1992). See discussion infra pp. 25-29.
26. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
27. See id. at 880.
28. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
29. See id. at 700 ("International law is part of our law.... [W]here there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations.").
30. The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815).
31. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 34, 67 (1804). The Charming Betsy is quoted with ap-
proval in Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953), and also by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
33. Id. at 694.
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to mean that international law is dynamic, evolving, and should not be
straight-jacketed by applying 18th Century legal interpretations to mod-
em problems.34 The articulation of international law expressed in The
Paquete Habana remains the prevailing view today.35
The Filartiga court concluded that "it is clear" from The Paquete
Habana and the related cases "that courts must interpret international
law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the
nations of the world today., 36 By looking to the contempory customs
and usages of nations, the Filartiga court concluded that torture is uni-
versally condemned and is thus part of the law of nations.37 International
law confers upon individuals a fundamental right to be free from torture,
and the ATS allows federal courts to adjudicate such rights. Thus, rea-
soned the court, since the prohibition on torture was part of the law of
nations, the court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims against
Pena.1
B. Criticism and Praise for Filartiga
Legal commentators, especially those in the human rights field,
praised Filartiga, and lawyers began to employ it in human rights vio-
lation cases.39 The decision was not without controversy, however.
Judge Robert Bork delivered perhaps the sharpest attack in his concur-
rence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.40 Judge Bork contended that
neither federal common law, federal statute, nor relevant treaties estab-
lished a cause of action for an individual alien plaintiff. He also took
issue with the broad definition of the "law of nations" offered by the
Filartiga court.42 Judge Bork argued that Congress intended that the
ATS provide tort jurisdiction for only three specific offenses: viola-
tion of safe-conducts, infringements on the rights of ambassadors, and
34. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, at 819-820 (D.C.Cir. 1984)(per curiam)(Bork, J., concurring). Bork's concurrence
in Tel-Oren is discussed infra p. 8.
35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1986).
36. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
37. See id. at 881-85.
38. See id.
39. See Richard B. Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Awarded by U.S. Courts, 15 Htmi. RTs. Q. 207, 209 (1993); Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789: Lessons from In re Marcos Human Rights Liti-
gation, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 491, 492 (1993).
40. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir. 1984)(per curiam)(Bork,
J., concurring).
41. See id. at 799.
42. See id. at 812-14.
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piracy.43 Blackstone enumerated these "offenses against the law of na-
tions" in his Commentaries, noted Judge Bork, "writings certainly
familiar to colonial lawyers." 44
Despite this criticism,45 the majority of federal courts accepted the
Filartiga holding that the ATS provides an individual alien plaintiff
with a federal cause of action.46 Today the prevailing view is that the
ATS confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction in any case in which the
plaintiff alleges a violation of the law of nations.47
48The law of nations consists of rules that states follow out of a
sense of legal obligation.49 It includes "general practice accepted as
law," and "the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions."' These rules are binding on states even in the absence of treaties
or other agreements.
The law of nations includes international human rights law, but pre-
cisely what constitutes a human right depends on the source of law
cited. In his seminal Four Freedoms speech in 1941, President Franklin
Roosevelt called for a world founded on freedom of speech and expres-
sion, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom
from want, and freedom from fear. This expansive vision helped set the
stage for the creation of the United Nations at the close of World War
43. See id. at 813-14.
44. Id.
45. Some academics have also criticized Filartiga and its progeny. See, e.g., Alfred P.
Rubin, U.S. Torts Suits by Aliens Based on International Law, 18-FALL FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 65 (1994); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 445 (1995).
46. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d. 844 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Christopher W.
Haffke, The Torture Victim Protection Act: More Symbol Than Substance, 43 EMORY L. J.
1467, 1479 (1994).
47. See Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847. See also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238
(2d Cir. 1996)("[The] statute confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction when the following
three conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the
law of nations (i.e., international law)."); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
779 (D.C.Cir. 1984)(per curiam)(Edwards, J., concurring); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 180 (D. Mass. 1995).
48. Notwithstanding Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren, the terms "law of nations" and
"customary international law" are used interchangeably by U.S. courts. See, e.g., Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 879-80.
49. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 244-45 (2d.
ed. 1995).
50. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1986). See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (4th
ed. 1990).
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I .52 The United Nations Charter committed its member nations to pro-
moting "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms.' 53 While these
terms are undeniably vague, subsequent U.N. enactments, most notably
the Universal Declaration of Human Right54, are much more specific in
identifying protected rights. These U.N. instruments, in turn, have pro-
vided the model for a host of regional instruments. 5  The rights thus
identified constitute what some commentators call a veritable "human
rights code" which gives meaning to the phrase "human rights and fun-
damental freedoms" in the Charter 6
III. FASHIONING A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Not all human rights violations are actionable under the Alien Tort
Statute. A wide range of rights may be called human rights, but for the
purposes of ATS coverage, only universally accepted human rights are
part of the law of nations. Determining which rights are universal can be
problematic, because the law of nations is evolving, and its content and
scope is determined by the consensus of nation-states.
Interference with Internet reports on torture is actionable under the
ATS as a violation of the human right to freedom of information. To
demonstrate this, it is necessary to determine the scope of the law of
nations and to demonstrate that it encompasses the freedom of informa-
tion, at least as far as freedom of information regarding torture is
concerned.
A. Determining the Scope of the Law of Nations
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala established the principle that a human right
must be so widely respected that it rises to the level of custom before it
52. See Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Ac-
complishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1, 2-3. (1988).
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
54. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNIVERSAL DECL. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doe. A/810,
U.N. Sales No. 152.1.15 (1948) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL DECL. OF HUMAN RIGHTS].
55. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3,
E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118; American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970); African Charter on Human and Peo-
ple's Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1981).
56. See THoM&As BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
A NUTSHELL § 6-7 (2d ed. 1990).
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is actionable. Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Irving Kaufman
noted that:
[T]he paucity of suits successfully maintained under the [ATS]
is readily attributable to the statute's requirement of alleging a
"violation of the law of nations" ... at the jurisdictional thresh-
old .... [Tihe narrowing construction that the Alien Tort
Statute has previously received reflects the fact that earlier
cases did not involve such well-established, universally recog-
nized norms of international law that are here at issue.
Judge Kaufman carefully reviewed previous cases brought under the
ATS but dismissed for failure to establish a violation of the law of na-
tions. He declared them to be distinguishable fromrFilartiga59 because
the prohibition on torture is clearly part of the law of nations. "[T]here
can be little doubt," he wrote, "that this action is properly brought in
federal court."6
Judge Kaufman pointed out that torture is mutually condemned by
every nation in the world. To be actionable under the ATS, an interna-
tional law violation must be of mutual concern to all nations. He cited
6111T v. Vencap, in which an international investment trust sued for
fraud, conversion and corporate waste. Judge Kaufman noted the liT
court's statement that even if every nation's municipal law prohibited
theft, that would not mean that "the Eighth Commandment, 'Thou Shalt
not steal' ... [is incorporated into] the law of nations."62 Judge Kaufman
concluded that to be actionable a principle of international law must be
a collective concern of all nations: "It is only where the nations of the
world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely
several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a
wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation
within the meaning of the [Alien Tort Statute]."'63
Judge Kaufman explained that an international law violation must
also be universally condemned to be actionable. The "Lopes/IIT rule,"
said the judge, shows that "a violation of the law of nations arises only
when there has been 'a violation by one or more individuals of those
57. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). But cf. Handel v. Artukovic, 601
F.Supp. 1421, 1426-27 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
58. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88.
59. Id. at 888.
60. Id. at 887.
61. IT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
62. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (quoting IITv. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015).
63. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 889.
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standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states
or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states
for their common good and/or in dealings inter se."' 6 Judge Kaufman
endorsed this view but cautioned that international law is not static, and
new rules of customary law continue to develop. "[T]he courts are not to
prejudge the scope of the issues that the nations of the world may deem
important to... their common good." 66
Judge Kaufman pointed out that torture is condemned by all nations
of the world, not just severally, as individual states, but universally.67
The nations of the world have reached an "international consensus" on
the right to be free from torture, and therefore that right has become
customary international law.68 "[Tihe torturer", said Judge Kaufman,
"has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind. 69
Filartiga established that torture violated the law of nations, but it
did not offer a comprehensive definition of the law of nations. It has
been left to treatises and subsequent case law to fll this gap. The Re-
statement of the Law of Foreign Relations enumerates specific offenses
to the law of nations.7' While the Restatement accepts the view that in-
ternational law is changing and evolving 2 section 702 lists offenses
which clearly violate customary international law:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave
trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d)
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations or internationally recognized
human rights.3
65. Id. at 889 (quoting lIT, 519 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard
Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292,297 (E.D.Pa. 1963)).
66. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888.
67. See id. at 884.
68. Id. at 884-85.
69. Id. at 890.
70. See Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279-80 (S.D. Cal. 1986)("Filartiga pro-
vides guidance insofar as it notes that the law of nations should be interpreted not as it was
in 1789, but as it has evolved... and to the extent that international law today limits a
state's power to torture .... However, there still is no consensus as to what constitutes a
"law of nations.").
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1986).
72. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
73. RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1986).
1997-19981
168 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 4:157
The comments to the section state, however, that "the list is not
necessarily complete, and is not closed." 74
Beyond the clear prohibitions contained in § 702 (a)-(g), the Re-
statement is vague about the precise parameters of customary
international law. It does provide some guidance as to how to determine
whether a right rises to the level of custom, citing three examples of
issues that may currently be customary law or may achieve that status in
the future: systematic religious discrimination, the right to property, and
gender discrimination.75
Systematic religious discrimination, notes the Restatement, is linked
in the United Nations Charter with racial discrimination and treats them
76both as human rights violations. Other covenants, laws, and constitu-
tions of states prohibit religious discrimination also. Although there is
no convention on the issue yet, there is a "strong case" that systematic
religious discrimination is a violation of customary law.
7
A general right to own property is internationally recognized, and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the right to own
and not be arbitrarily deprived of property. 78 The Restatement observes
that there is "wide disagreement" as to the "scope and content" of the
right, and this disagreement "weighs against the conclusion" that a right
to property has become customary international law.79 Despite disa-
greement about the parameters of the right to property, there is general
acceptance among states that a right to property exists. This may be dis-
positive, as "all states have accepted a limited core of rights to private
property, and violation of such rights, as state policy, may already be a
violation of customary law."80
Gender discrimination is prohibited by numerous agreements, in-
cluding the United Nations Charter," the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights82 and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."' The
Restatement notes that while many states have laws prohibiting gender
discrimination, gender discrimination still occurs in many states "in
74. Id. at § 702 cmt. a.
75. See id. at § 702 cmt. j, k, & 1.
76. See id. at § 702 cmt. j.
77. See id.
78. UNIVERSAL DECL. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 54, art. 17.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 702
cmt. k (1986).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
82. UNIVERSAL DECL. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 54, art. 2.
83. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 178,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/4.
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varying degrees." Discrimination in at least some matters, however, as
a matter of state policy, may be prohibited by customary international
law.
In its discussion of whether religious discrimination, property
rights, and gender discrimination rise to the level of custom, the Re-
statement focuses on the universality of acceptance of a right. The
discussion of property rights in comment (k) is particularly instructive.
The Restatement acknowledges that there is wide disagreement as to the
precise scope of the right, but points to the fact that there is an irreduci-
ble core right to property recognized by all states. If there is a some
customary right to own property, it is this core right, on which all states
agree.
Subsequent cases have followed Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and the Re-
statement, focusing on universality to determine if a norm is part of the
law of nations. Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic en-
dorsed and expanded upon Judge Kaufman's analysis, asserting that
• 85
references to piracy and slave-trading were not fortuitous. Historically,
perpetrators of these crimes were "dubbed enemies of all mankind," and
as such could be brought to justice by any state.8 6 "The inference is that
persons may be susceptible to civil liability if they commit either a
crime traditionally warranting universal jurisdiction or an offense that
comparably violates current norms of international law." To identify
such crimes, Judge Edwards turned to Restatement § 702. Although he
declined to say whether any of the violations enumerated in § 702 (a)-
(g) actually constituted a violation of the law of nations, he endorsed the
process used by the Restatement and other commentators to define the
scope of the law of nations. The crucial inquiry, said Judge Edwards, is
whether a norm is "definable, universal, and obligatory".88
In Guinto v. Marcos,s9 the District Court for the Southern District of
California confronted the question of whether the law of nations in-
cluded the right to freedom of speech as understood in the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 90 Guinto accepted the conclusion
of Filartiga that the law of nations should be interpreted as it has
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
cmt. 1 (1986).
85. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(per cu-
riam)(Edwards, J., concurring)(Circuit Judges Edwards and Bork, and Senior Circuit Judge
Robb filed separate concurring opinions in Tel-Oren).
86. Id. at 781 (quoting 1 L. Oppenheim, INT'L LAW § 272 at 609).
87. Id. at 781.
88. Id.
89. Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
90. Guinto did not reach the question of whether freedom of information is part of the
law of nations.
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evolved and exists today, not as it was in 1789, but noted that there is no
consensus as to what constitutes a law of nations.9' Guinto elected to
follow Judge Edwards' universality approach from Tel-Oren.92 The
court concluded that a First Amendment right to free speech is not uni-
versally recognized, "and so does not constitute a 'law of nations."' 93 In
Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia considered whether a breach of dip-
lomatic immunity arising from the arrest, imprisonment, and possible
death of a diplomat violated the law of nations. 94 The Court cited Tel-
Oren and decided that the separate concurrences of Judge Edwards and
Judge Bork respectively embodied broad and narrow views of the law of
nations.95 Under Judge Edwards' analysis, a principle arose to the level
of a law of nations if the "community of nations has reached a consen-
sus."' 96 By contrast, Judge Bork sought to maintain the separation of
powers by limiting applicability of the ATS to only those cases where
"the law of nations clearly envisions judicial involvement." 97 The Von
Dardel court noted Judge Bork's reliance on a principle established in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: "the greater the degree of codifi-
cation or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it,"
as it is less likely to be "inconsistent with the national interest or inter-
national justice."98 Judge Bork's reading of Sabbatino, said the Von
Dardel court, implied that the more a principle of international law is
widely recognized, the more likely it is that the judiciary will be within
its role of applying an established principle to circumstances of fact
rather than interfering with the executive's role of determining foreign
poliy.99 This interpretation of Judge Bork's Tel-Oren opinion supports
the view that universality is the key to determining the scope of the law
of nations.
The Von Dardel court found Judge Bork's opinion confusing, how-
ever, because he also stated that the law of nations should be limited to
91. Guinto, 654 F. Supp. at 279.
92. Id. at280.
93. Id. at 280.
94. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
95. The court also considered Judge Robb's opinion in Tel-Oren. Judge Robb's opinion,
said Von Dardel, relied on the political question doctrine, which did not deprive the Von
Dardel court of jurisdiction. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 258-59.
96. See Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 257.
97. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 257-258.
98. Id. at 258 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398, 428
(1964)).
99. See Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 258.
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the meaning it had when the ATS was adopted in 1789. '0 Von Dardel
did not try to resolve this ambiguity, holding that violations of diplo-
matic immunity are prohibited by the law of nations under even the
most narrow reading.'0 ' Nor did Von Dardel definitively establish the
importance of universality in determining the scope of the law of na-
tions. Nevertheless, by favorably citing Judge Edwards and pointing out
the contradictions contained in Judge Bork's opinion, the case added
support to the position taken in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and the Restate-
ment that universality is determinative.
In Forti v. Suarez-Mason,10 2 the plaintiffs brought an ATS action
against an Argentine general seeking damages for torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention, murder, and causing a "disappearance." In defining
whether the claims came within the law of nations, the District Court for
the Northern District of California focused on the universality of their
proscription. 0 3 The court relied on Judge Edwards' opinion in Tel-Oren
and on the definition of an "international tort" as "first recognized in
Filartiga."' Violations of the law of nations, held Forti, are
"characterized by universal consensus in the international community as
to their binding status and their content."' 05 Utilizing this standard, the
court found that official torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and
summary execution, violated customary international law. The court
dismissed the plaintiff's fourth claim, holding that there was no interna-
tional consensus as to the elements of a claim for causing the
disappearance of an individual. °6
This is not an exhaustive discussion of all the cases analyzing cus-
tomary international law, but the trend is clear: U.S. courts have
embraced Filartiga and the Restatement.1°'
Critics of this approach were preempted when Congress enacted the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA),' °8 which established "an
unambiguous basis for a cause of action ... under [the Alien Tort Stat-
ute]." ' '" In reporting on the TVPA, both the House and Senate
100. See id. at 258.
101. See id.
102. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
103. See id. at 1539-41.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1540.
106. See id. at 1543. The court eventually revisited this last claim, and held that the
"international community has ... reached a consensus on the definition of a
'disappearance"' Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707,710 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
107. Judge Bork's concurrence in Tel-Oren remains a minority view. See S. Rep. No.
102-249 at 4-5 (1991).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
109. S. REP. No. 102-249, at4 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at3 (1991).
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Committees on the Judiciary explained that the TVPA was enacted to
dispel any lingering doubts about the validity of Filartiga and its prog-
eny. They specifically noted Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren
questioning the existence of a private right of action under the ATS and
declared that the explicit purpose of the TVPA was to grant such a right
and expand on the remedy. ° Under the ATS, the remedy had been
available to aliens only; the TVPA extended it to U.S. citizens as well."'
The House and the Senate expressed approval of the Filartiga ap-
proach which focused on universality and consensus to determine when
a norm rises to the level of custom. The House and Senate Reports
stated that "[o]fficial torture and summary execution violate standards
accepted by virtually every nation. The universal consensus condemn-
ing these practices has assumed the status of customary international
law.' 12 They noted that although the TVPA only dealt with torture and
extra-judicial execution, the scope of customary international law is not
limited to these two offenses. Nor is the scope of the law fixed. It can
change and evolve. The TVPA provides a cause of action for torture and
summary execution under the ATS, but ATS claims may also be made
"based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into
rules of customary international law.""1
4
Congress has thus expressed its approval of the idea that, for pur-
poses of the ATS, the law of nations can evolve, and the scope of the
law should be determined by the consensus of states.1 5 Thus, a norm
which gains universal acceptance rises to the level of customary inter-
national law.'
16
110. S. REP. No. 102-249, at4-5 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at4 (1991).
111. S. REP. No. 102-249, at5 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at4 (1991).
112. S. RaP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 2-3 (1991)
(emphasis added).
113. S. REP. No. 102-249, at5 (1991); H.R. RP. No. 102-367, at4 (1991).
114. H.R. RaP. No. 102-367, at4 (1991)(emphasis added).
115. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996)("Congress has made clear
that its enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 was intended to codify the
cause of action recognized by this Circuit in Filartiga, even as it extends the cause of action
to plaintiffs who are United States citizens (citation omitted). With a broad reading of the
Alien Tort Act settled as the law of this Circuit and codified by Congress as recently as
1991, we decline the invitation to limit the Act to the one category of torts that arguably
prompted its enactment.").
116. Since the enactment of the Torture Victims Protection Act, one court has repack-
aged Filartiga's instruction on customary international law as a three factor test. Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). The Xuncax court held that for an act to con-
stitute a violation of customary international law: (1) no state may condone the act in
question and a there must be a recognizable universal consensus of prohibition against it; (2)
there must be sufficient criteria to determine whether the action amounts to the prohibited act
and this violates the norm; (3) the prohibition against it must be non-derogable and therefore
binding at all times upon all actors. Id. at 184.
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B. The Law of Nations and the Right to Freedom of Information
By following the guidance provided by the courts and the Congress,
it is possible to determine whether freedom of information has ripened
into a rule of customary international law. Freedom of information is
accepted in some form by nearly every nation in the world and is em-
bodied in all the world's major human rights regimes. There is
disagreement over the precise contours of the right of freedom of infor-
mation, but there is a fundamental core right that is universally
respected. This core right includes a right to freedom of information
regarding torture. Violation of this right is the first basis on which a
plaintiff may file an ATS claim for suppression of reports on torture
over the Internet.
All human rights regimes recognize a right to freedom of informa-
tion or expression, although the scope of that right varies considerably.
Freedom of information is probably least protected in the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was adopted by Organi-
zation of African Unity in 1963, and has been adopted by virtually every
African nation. 17 Article 9 of the Charter protects freedom of informa-
tion, declaring that "[e]very individual shall have the right to receive
information" and that "[e]very individual shall have the right to express
and disseminate his opinions within the law."
' 18
The African Charter is distinctive in that it proclaims duties as well
as rights," 9 and these limitations could arguably limit the freedoms
guaranteed in Article 9. The African Charter, like the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, declares that individuals have
responsibilities to their communities,' 20 but the Charter "is the first hu-
man rights treaty to include an enumeration of, to give forceful attention
to, individual's duties. ' 2 ' The duties of individuals are outlined in Arti-
cles 27, 28, and 29 of the African Charter, and Article 29 is particularly
broad in reach.'2 Phrases such as "serve the national community," "not
117. See Human and People's Rights in Africa and The African Charter, Report of a
Conference held in Nairobi from 2 to 4 December 1985 convened by the International Com-
mission of Jurists, 93-94.
118. African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981,
21 I.L.M. 59 (1981), art. 9.
119. See Bums Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Ap-
praisal, 20 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 585, 608-14 (1987); Lees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah,
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICE 165-66 (H. Hannum 2d ed., 1992).
120. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 83.
121. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MoRALs 692 (1996).
122. Article 27.
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to compromise the security of the state," and "strengthen social and na-
tional solidarity" sound suspiciously like grounds on which a nation
could seek to justify severe limitations on the right to freedom of infor-
mation. 12
Other international regimes recognize a right to freedom of infor-
mation as well. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without inter-
ference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers."' 24 Article 19 of the International
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a similar provision,
guaranteeing "the right to freedom of expression," including "freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers ... through any ... media ... ", though this right may be
limited as necessary to protect national security, public order, or public
health or morals.' 5 The European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 10, and the American
1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the
State and other legally recognised communities and the international
community.
2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality, and common
interest.
Article 28.
Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings
without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and rein-
forcing mutual respect and tolerance.
Article 29.
The individual shall also have the duty:
1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for
the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times,
to maintain them in case of need;
2. To serve this national community by placing his physical and intellectual
abilities at its service;
3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is;
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly
when the latter is threatened;
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial
integrity of his country and to contribute to its defense in accordance with
the law;...
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to
the promotion and achievement of African Unity.
African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
59 (1981), arts. 27-29.
123. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 122, at 694.
124. UNIVERSAL DECL. OF HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 54, art. 19.
125. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 83, at 184.
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Convention on Human Rights, Article 13, protect the freedom of ex-
pression with provisions substantially similar to those contained in the
Universal Declaration and the ICCPR. The European Convention,
however, states that this right may be limited "in the interests of na-
tional security, ... for the prevention of disorder or crime, ... for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclo-
sure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary." 27 The American Convention
also contains the caveat that the exercise of the right to freedom of ex-
pression may be limited as necessary for "the protection of national
security, public order, or public health or morals."128 Despite these
qualifying provisions in the various human rights instruments, it is gen-
erally recognized that freedom of information is a superior right, not in
competition with an equivalent right of the state to limit access to in-
formation for national security reasons. In the well-known case of
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights
explained that the decisionmaker in human rights litigation "is faced not
with a choice between two conflicting principles but with a principle of
freedom of expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which
must be narrowly interpreted."'
129
Nevertheless, in the context of torture, the question arises whether
the exceptions devour the rule. May a state in any way restrict reporting
or receiving information about torture under the right to freedom of in-
formation? If so, it would be hard to claim that such a right to freedom
of information has achieved the level of universality and consensus re-
quired for it become part of the law of nations under the ATS.
The answer is an unequivocal no. Though the right to freedom of in-
formation is subject to exceptions in all international human rights
regimes, it attains customary international law status because a "core
right" to freedom of information exists universally. Furthermore, that
126. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
dons, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45,
Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118, Article 10; American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), Article 13.
127. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45,
Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118, Article 10.
128. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), Ar-
ticle 13.
129. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41 (1979). See also
Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1991)
(restraints necessary in interests of national security, protecting reputation or rights of otheri,
preventing disclosure of information received in confidence and for maintaining authority of
judiciary).
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right is non-derogable in all circumstances. The Restatement notes that
the right to property has not been clearly defined by all states, but "all
states have accepted a limited core of rights to private property, and
violation of such rights, as state policy, may already be a violation of
customary law.", 3 Following this line of analysis it is possible to iden-
tify a non-derogable core right to freedom of information, because all
states have accepted the primacy of the right in at least some circum-
stances.
Transnational freedom of information attained the level of an inter-
nationally recognized human right through the initiative of the Western
Democracies after World War 11.13' From its founding, the United Na-
tions General Assembly affirmed the importance of freedom of
information, declaring that it is "a fundamental human right and ... is
the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is conse-
crated. ' 32 The U.N. codified the right to freedom of information in 1948
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In response to the concerns of some member nations, the U.N. pre-
pared the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information soon after
enacting the Universal Declaration.'3 The Draft Convention was pre-
sented to the General Assembly in 1949, where it was hotly debated. It
was never ratified by the General Assembly, but it laid the foundation
for Articles 19 and 20 of the International Convenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights which was adopted by the U.N. and opened for signature
in 1966.135
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. k (1986)(emphasis added). See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
131. Bruno Simma, Grenzllberschreitender Informationsflufl und domaine riservg der
Staaten, 19 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR V6LKERRECHT 39, 49-50
(1979). Freedom of information as a principle of international law has been debated since
long before World War II, of course. Freedom of speech is protected in the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, and a prohibition on the spreading of propaganda has existed at
least since the French Revolution. Vernon Van Dyke, The Responsibility of States for Inter-
national Propaganda, 34 Am. J. INT'L L 58, 60 (1940). International law prior to World War
II, to the extent that it concerned freedom of information at all, concentrated on regulating or
prohibiting propaganda. See Elizabeth Downey, A Historical Survey of the International
Regulation of Propaganda, 1984 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUDIES (MICH. J. INT'L. L.) 341,
341-45.
132. U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1947).
133. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any me-
dia and regardless of frontiers." UNIVERSAL DECL. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 54, art. 19.
134. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, text at 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 593. See
also 1951 U.N.Y.B. 508.
135. See Downey, supra note 131, at 346-48. See also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 83, arts. 19 and 20.
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Articles 19 and 20 represented a compromise between the nations of
the Soviet-aligned East and the U.S.-aligned West. The Soviets favored
granting states broad powers to restrict freedom of information to pre-
vent incitement to violence, hatred, or war, while the United States was
wary of any restrictions on freedom of speech.1 6 Paragraph 3 of Article
19 and Article 20 allowed restrictions on the right of freedom of infor-
mation for certain purposes, satisfying the Soviets, but kept those
exceptions narrow and maintained the primacy of the right, satisfying
the United States.
137
The U.N. prepared the Convention on the International Right of
Correction, another document relating to freedom of information, soon
after its founding." Countries whose communications systems were
still undeveloped or had been severely damaged in the War supported
the Convention as a means of counteracting a one-sided supply of news
and information 39 These countries were concerned that the United
States could dominate the post-war world through use of its superior
communications infrastructure. The Convention came into force in
1952, but it was only ratified by a handful of countries.
The right of correction resurfaced in 1978 with the adoption of a se-
ries of documents collectively known as the "New World Information
Order" by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization (UNESCO). 4 ' This Order included the Declaration of
Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media
to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promo-
tion of Human Rights and to countering Racialism, Apartheid, and
Incitement to War. The Declaration of Fundamental Principles does not
explicitly refer to the Draft Convention on the International Right of
Correction, but it is reminiscent of it. Article 5 provides that countries
are entitled to have their own views disseminated if they feel it neces-
sary to correct inequities in the flow of information.142 It should be
noted, however, that the New World Information and Communications
Order does not allow states to restrict freedom of information. It seeks
136. See Downey, supra note 131, at 348.
137. See Downey, supra note 131, at 348-349.
138. The Convention on the International Right of Correction was proposed in 1948.
The U.N. also proposed to address the issue of access to information and its transmission
from country to country but was unable to come to agreement over a convention. A draft
Convention on the Gathering and International Transmission of News was proposed but
never adopted. EDWARD W. PLOMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING CON1HuNICATIONS
AND INFORMATION 127-28 (1982).
139. See Downey, supra note 131, at 350.
140. See Ploman, supra note 138, at 128.
141. See Downey, supra note 131, at 351.
142. See Downey, supra note 131, at 351.
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only to promote a balanced flow of information between countries and
not to place limitations or restrictions on that flow.143
Although these debates about the right to freedom of information
have been going on almost constantly since 1949, there can be no doubt
that the right extends far enough to protect individuals reporting on or
receiving information about torture. As noted above, freedom of infor-
mation is a fundamental right, subject only to certain limited exceptions
such as national security. 44 The burden falls on the state to establish a
valid reason for the restriction. The state would probably have to pub-
licly declare its intent to make the restriction in advance,145 since prior
restraint is strongly disfavored by international courts.46
Broad restrictions on freedom of information are difficult to justify
under the limited exceptions available. Any attempt to restrict the core
right to freedom of information regarding torture necessarily implicates
the prohibition against torture itself, and is thus even harder to justify. If
a state stems the flow of information regarding torture, it is complicit in
that torture. The explicit purpose of reporting on torture is to put an end
to it, and a government which interferes with this process helps to en-
sure that torture will continue to be practiced.
The American Convention on Human Rights, The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
contain similar provisions regarding the rights freedom of informa-
tion and the grounds on which states may infringe on it.' 47 A state
trying to justify curbing freedom of information regarding torture
must confront the fact that the prohibition on torture is universal
4 1
143. See Michael J. Farley, Comment, Conflicts Over Government Control of Informa-
tion-The United States and UNESCO, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1071, 1074 (1985).
144. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41 (1979). See
also Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1991)
(restraints necessary in interests of national security, protecting reputation or rights of others,
preventing disclosure of information received in confidence and for maintaining authority of
judiciary).
145. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECOM-
MENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF
PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, Sept. 23, 1980, OECD Doc.
C(80)58, 20 I.L.M. 422.
146. See Louas G. LOUCADES, ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPING LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
6 (1995) (citing, inter alia, Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 30 (1991)).
147. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3,
E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118; American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970); African Charter on Human and Peo-
ple's Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1981).
148. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
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and non-derogable. 14 Even under the African Charter, 15 it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a state to restrict the freedom
of information regarding torture without running afoul of the prohibition
against torture. Even if restrictions could be permitted under the terms
of the regional human rights instruments, the restricting nation would
still be in violation of United Nations instruments.
There can be only one conclusion: freedom of information may not
be universally accepted, but a core right to freedom of information, en-
compassing the right to report on or receive information about torture,
rises to the level of customary international law. For the purposes of the
ATS, a claim will lie where a plaintiff alleges that a defendant interfered
with the receipt or transmission of an Internet report on torture, and that
such interference violated the plaintiffs right to freedom of informa-
tion.
C. Choice of Law and the Issue of Damages
The ATS provides a private cause of action and a federal forum for
an alien plaintiff seeking redress for a violation of the law of nations.
15
Proving that freedom of information is part of the law of nations is
merely a threshold issue. Plaintiffs alleging tortious interference with
the freedom of information regarding torture must consider choice of
law and damages if they hope to prevail.
There are two classes of possible plaintiffs in actions alleging tor-
tious interference with reporting on torture through the Internet:
claimants who are victims of torture, and claimants who report on tor-
ture.
A victim of torture should have no difficulty proving damages. A
greater problem confronts a plaintiff who was prevented from reporting
on torture, but who was not tortured himself. What injury has been suf-
fered? If the plaintiff's communications hardware was damaged or
.. . 152
confiscated, the plaintiff could seek compensation for lost property.
However, this amount could be trivial if only a single piece of inexpen-
sive but critical hardware, such as a modem, keyboard, or telephone,
149. RESTATEMNT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 n. 11 (1986).
150. Arguably the African Charter is the least protective of the freedom of information.
See African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 59 (1981), Article 9.
151. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846-48 (11th Cir. 1996); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 934 (1995).
152. Someone seeking to cut the plaintiff's communications could destroy or remove
the plaintiff's computer or modem, or important related components.
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was involved. Disrupting one's link to the Internet does not necessarily
involve damaging any property at all. A computer link can be broken by
simply cutting the telephone line or by degrading the signal on an intact
line to the point that it is too poor for the modem to communicate.""
Such an ATS plaintiff will have to claim his injury flows not from
physical harm or property damage but from interference with his right
to freedom of information.' As with the first class of plaintiffs, the
question becomes what law should be applied in measuring damages.
The choice of law problem faced by both classes of plaintiffs was
addressed by the district court in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.'55 On remand
from the Court of Appeals, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff,
and turned to the subject of damages. The court said it must look:
. .. to international law, which, as the Court of Appeals stated,
'became a part of the common law of the United States upon the
adoption of the Constitution.' .... By enacting Section 1350,
Congress entrusted that task to the federal courts and gave them
the.power to choose and develop federal remedies to effectuate
the purposes of the international law incorporated into United
States common law.'56
The court weighed the interests of Paraguay, where the tort had oc-
curred, in having its law applied to the case, against the interests of the
United States in having international norms applied. The court con-
cluded it should "look first to Paraguayan law in determining the
remedy for the violation of international law"' 57 but said it would only
apply Paraguayan laws to the extent they "do not inhibit the appropriate
enforcement of the applicable law or conflict with the public policy of
the United States.
158
The Filartiga plaintiffs sought damages for five distinct injuries, in-
cluding compensation for pain and suffering, loss of income, and
medical expenses. These the court awarded in accordance with the lex
153. There are many other ways to disrupt communications. For example, enacting a
statute proscribing certain types of communication could conceivably violate the plaintiffs
rights.
154. Under American law this is not necessarily a solution, because such a claim would
yield only nominal damages. However, it is questionable that American law would apply to
the issue of damages. See discussion infra pp. 23-25.
155. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). For a thorough discus-
sion of choice of law issues in Filartiga and related cases, see Richard B. Lillich, Damages
for Gross Violations of International Human Rights Awarded by U.S. Courts, 15 Htms. RTs.
Q. 207 (1993).
156. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 863 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d
Cir. 1980))(emphasis omitted).
157. Filartiga, 577 F.Supp. at 864.
158. Id. at 863-64.
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delicti.15 9 The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages, which were not
recoverable under the Paraguayan Civil Code. The court nevertheless
awarded punitive damages, justifying the award on grounds of public
policy by stating that the "manifest objectives" of the international pro-
hibition on torture "can only be vindicated by imposing punitive
damages."' 6 The court went on to explain that,
[c]hief among the considerations the court must weigh is
the fact that this case concerns not a local tort but a wrong as to
which the world has seen fit to speak. Punitive damages are de-
signed not merely to teach a defendant not to repeat his conduct
but to deter others from following his example ... To accomplish
that purpose this court must clear the depth of the international re-
vulsion against torture and measure the award in accordance with
the enormity of the offense. Thereby the judgment may perhaps
have some deterrent effect.'
6 1
The court concluded that "punitive damages of no less that
$5,000,000 to each plaintiff is appropriate .... ,,162
Filartiga points to a solution for the choice of law problem
confronted by both classes of plaintiffs. Damages may be awarded to
the first class of plaintiff in accordance with the lex delicti, but only
insofar as they adequately reflect the world's distaste for torture. Where
they are inadequate, the court may award a larger sum, including
punitive damages. The "manifest objectives behind the international
prohibition on torture"'63 demand nothing less. The second class of
plaintiffs may seek compensation for property damage, if any has
occurred, but in addition, the plaintiff may seek punitive damages.
Filartiga noted a general hesitancy by American courts to award
punitive damages, but pointed out there was some "precedent for the
award of punitive damages in [international] tort" on rare occasions.1ta
The court made reference to Letelier, where the DC district court
awarded punitive damages of $2,000,000 for "tortious actions ... in
159. See id. at 865.
160. Id. at 864, 865. The Filartiga court based its decision partly on dicta from The
Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1, 41, 6 L. Ed. 405 (1826), where Justice Story wrote that "an at-
tack from revenge and malignity, from gross abuse of power, and a settled purpose of
mischief... may be punished by all the penalties which the law of nations can properly
administer." Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 865 (quoting The Mariana Flora, 24 U.S. 1, 41, 6 L.
Ed. 405 (1826)).
161. Filartiga, 577 F.Supp. at 866.
162. Id at 867.
163. Id. at 865.
164. Id. at 865.
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violation of international law."' 65 A violation of one's freedom of
information regarding torture strongly implies complicity with the act of
torture itself. Given the international condemnation of torture, punitive
damages would be justified where there is no other plausible
explanation for the defendant's conduct.
IV. FASHIONING A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE
Apart from a claim for violation of the freedom of information, in-
terference with reporting on or receiving information about torture over
the Internet should give rise to an ATS claim for violation of the prohi-
bition against torture. In contrast to the freedom of information, whose
status as customary international law is arguable, there is no doubt that
the prohibition on torture rises to the level of custom. For this claim to
be tenable, however, a plaintiff must establish that the party interfering
with Internet communications on torture becomes implicated in the act
of torture itself.
A claim for torture may be brought under the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act, which was passed by Congress partly in response to167
Filartiga and its progeny. The TVPA states:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation-(l) subjects an individual to tor-
ture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extra-judicial killing,
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's
legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in
an action for wrongful death.'68
Determining who may be held liable for torture requires an under-
standing of the phrase "subjects an individual to torture" which in turn
165. Id. at 865 (citing Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F.Supp. 259, 266 (D.D.C.
1980)).
166. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
167. See supra pp. 15-16 and accompanying notes. The TVPA codified the holding of
Filartiga, establishing "an unambiguous basis for a cause of action" under the ATS, but
expanded the remedy "also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad." The TVPA
does not preempt the ATS, under which claims based on violations of customary interna-
tional law other than torture may still be brought. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4 (1991).
168. Torture Victim Protection Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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requires an examination of the legislative history of the TVPA, and the
United Nations Convention Against Torture. 6 9
It is no coincidence that the language of the TVPA is similar to the
Convention Against Torture. Congress passed the TVPA to carry out the
letter and the intent of the Convention, and the TVPA explicitly adopts
the definition of torture from the Convention.17" In its report on the Act,
the House Judiciary Committee notes that the Convention was strongly
supported by the U.S., and that it "obligates state parties to adopt meas-
ures to ensure that torturers are held legally accountable for their acts. 7'
"One such obligation is to provide means of civil redress to victims of
torture.' 72 The TVPA, says the report, is Congress' response to this ob-
ligation.'73
The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee echoes the House
Report. The purpose of the TVPA is to "carry out the intent of the Con-
vention," under which states are obligated "to adopt measures" ensuring
torturers are held accountable.' 74 "This legislation will do precisely
that," says the Senate Report.
75
Both the legislative history of the TVPA and the Convention on
Torture indicate that a person does not have to conduct torture person-
ally to be held liable for such an act. The Senate Report explains that the
TVPA allows a torture victim to sue "persons who ordered, abetted, or
assisted in the torture," including higher officials, even though those
officials may not have personally performed or ordered the abuses.
71
"Under international law," says the Report, "responsibility for torture
... extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those
acts-anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated, or
knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them."' The Senate Report
approvingly quotes the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Pun-
ish Torture, which holds any person who "orders, instigates or induces
the use of torture, or directly commits it or who, being able to prevent it,
fails to do so" liable for the crime of torture. The Senate Report also
169. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Oct. 21, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., 93d plen. Mtg., Supp No. 21 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter Convention against Torture].
170. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991); H.R. RP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
171. H.R. RP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. S. RaP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 8-9.
177. Id. at 9.
178. Id. at n. 16.
1997-1998]
184 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 4:157
cites Forti v. Suarez-Mason79 and In re Yamashita, 8° two cases where
higher officials were held responsible for torture and summary execu-
tion even though they were not themselves accused of committing those
acts. The Report points out that "low-level officials cannot escape li-
ability by claiming that they were acting under orders of superiors.,1
The House Report says less about TVPA liability than the Senate
Report, but nevertheless indicates that persons may be liable even if
they did not personally perform the acts of torture in question. Unlike
the Senate Report, the House Report does not explicitly state that higher
authorities who order, tolerate, or knowingly ignore torture may also be
held liable. Nevertheless, it approvingly cites Filartiga and declares that
the TVPA expands the existing remedy available under the ATS, im-
plying that such persons may be liable. The House Report also does
not cite Forti, but it seems unlikely the Report would have spoken so
favorably of Filartiga and expanded the ATS remedy if felt strongly
that Forti was wrongly decided.' s '
Like the Senate Report, the House Report ties the TVPA to interna-
tional definitions of torture, indicating that the House believed that
TVPA liability should reach more than just those persons who person-
ally commit torture. The Report states that the TVPA provides a cause
of action against anyone who "subjects a person to torture .. ." and de-
fines torture "in accordance with international standards."' 14 The
definition of torture in the TVPA "tracks the definition of 'torture'
adopted in the Torture Convention and the understandings included in
the Senate's ratification of the Convention."""5
The Convention on Torture places responsibility for acts of torture
not only on the person committing the torture, but also on anyone who
assisted or abetted the torture. Article 1 defines torture expansively and
expressly implicates persons who abet or tolerate torture:
179. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The Report states that
"although Suarez Mason was not accused directly of torturing or murdering anyone, he was
found civilly liable for those acts which were committed by officers under his command
about which he was aware and which he did nothing to prevent." S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9
(1991).
180. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The Report states that "the Supreme Court
held a general of the Imperial Japanese Army responsible for a pervasive pattern of war
crimes committed by his officers when he knew or should have known that they were going
on but failed to prevent or punish them." S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9 (1991).
181. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9 (1991).
182. See H.R. RP. No. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991).
183. The House report does not cite In re Yamashita either, but that is understandable.
In re Yamashita was decided in 1946 and did not involve the ATS.
184. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at4 (1991).
185. Id.
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Article 1. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the term
"torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain and suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.... 86
Although Article 1 refers to a "definition" of torture, it instead gives
a description of torture for the purpose of understanding and imple-
menting the Convention. 87
If Article 1 were a definition, a defendant could argue that the
phrase "consent or acquiescence of a public official" is only relevant to
determining what acts constitute torture, and that it does not define who
a torturer is for purposes of determining liability. "Torturer", under such
an interpretation, is not defined. A court hearing a torture claim would
have no clear idea what it means to "subject a person to torture" for the
purposes of the TVPA. Reading Article 1 as a description of torture
avoids this problem, because it implicitly defines several relevant terms
and provides the court with guidance as to how to interpret the language
of the TVPA.
The language of Articles 2 and 4 also demonstrates that responsi-
bility for torture should be assigned broadly. Article 2 requires each
signatory state to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its juris-
diction."" s This does more than simply require that a state make torture
illegal. A party state must take affirmative steps to prevent acts of tor-
ture. '89 Article 4 mandates that each state must criminalize torture, and
also requires that criminal sanctions be applied "to an attempt to commit
torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or par-
ticipation in torture..'1.
Together, Articles 2 and 4 place the burden on the state to intervene
when it discovers that torture is being conducted and to work actively to
186. Convention against Torture, supra note 169, at 197 (emphasis added).
187. J. HERiAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE. A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 122 (1988).
188. Convention Against Torture, supra note 169, § 2(1) at 197.
189. Id.
190. Convention against Torture, supra note 169, § 4(1) at 198 (emphasis added).
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stop torture from occurring in the future. In light of the broad descrip-
tion of torture contained in Article 1, instigation of torture, consent, or
acquiescence should be considered complicity for purposes of Article 4.
Any official who is complicit regarding torture becomes implicated in
the torture itself. Therefore, under the Convention, liability will attach
to any official who does nothing more than look the other way in the
face of torture. Any greater level of involvement by an official, even
providing the slightest amount of affirmative assistance to torturers, also
makes that official liable.
The TVPA thus allows suits against any persons implicated in the
torture, not just the persons committing the prohibited acts. While the
Senate and House reports are quite clear on this issue, the dispositive
fact is that the TVPA explicitly carries out the intent of the Convention
and adopts the Convention's definition of torture.
For the purposes of the ATS, this establishes that interference with
Internet reports on torture is a tortious violation of the customary inter-
national law against torture. If one of the purposes of reporting on
torture is to help prevent it, and interfering with reporting makes that
job more difficult, such interference must constitute complicity in the
torture. If a state must take affirmative action to prevent torture, and
offering even minimal assistance to torturers implicates officials in the
torture, an official who takes any steps to hinder Internet reports on
torture is liable under the TVPA for abetting and assisting in torture. 9'
191. But-for causation, i.e that but-for suppression of an Internet report the torture
being reported on would not have occurred, is not required to establish liability. States have
an affirmative obligation to stop any torture occurring within their borders, see supra notes
171-175 and accompanying text, and governments can be implicated in torture merely by
their acquiescence to the act, see supra note 177 and accompanying text. Since this low
threshold of liability can be met by mere inaction, actively assisting torture by interfering
with Internet reports will also meet this threshold. See also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F.Supp 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(holding the defendant civilly liable for those acts which were
committed by officers under his command about which he was aware and which he did
nothing to prevent, even though he was not accused of torturing or murdering anyone di-
rectly).
For the same reasons, a defendant government will also be liable in tort for complicity
after-the-fact. Where the suppressed Internet report relates to ongoing torture, there is no
question that the state is liable. As long as the torture continues, and the state prevents re-
porting, it is implicated.
A problem may arise if the victim is no longer being subjected to torture when the Inter-
net report is suppressed. A defendant may claim that after-the-fact suppression is not
causally linked to the torture and that although the state violated international law, it did not
commit a tort. This defense should be rejected however, as such a causal link is not required,
as noted above. For the purposes of the Convention Against Torture, liability attaches when
a person is merely complicit in torture. There are no distinctions between the persons actu-
ally conducting the torture and persons ordering, consenting to, or acquiescing in the torture,
see supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text, and the Convention does not require that
consent or acquiescence be expressed before the torture actually occurs.
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V. ADDITIONAL BARRIERS TO ATS CLAIMS
While interference with Internet reports on torture constitutes tor-
tious violations of both the right to freedom of information on torture
and the prohibition on torture, plaintiffs will have to clear still more
hurdles before their claims will prevail.
A. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity presents a substantial barrier to
ATS litigation. Plaintiffs trying to sue torturers and their accomplices
may have trouble finding them; the persons' names may not be known
to the plaintiffs. If their identity is known, they may be beyond the ju-
risdiction of U.S. courts or otherwise judgment-proof. They may be
dead. If they are alive and can be subjected to trial, they may have al-
most no assets against which to execute civil judgment.'9
For all these reasons it is desirable to sue the state in which the tor-
ture occurred, either the government itself or the head of state. The
government is easily identifiable, and it may have property or accounts
in the U.S., providing a deep-pocket defendant. Unfortunately, sover-
eign immunity will insulate governments from liability in almost all
cases.
Filartiga and the TVPA conclusively establish that an action against
individual defendants is available under the ATS. Whether states can be
defendants, however, has been an open question until recently. In Ar-
gentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,'93 the Supreme Court
rejected an ATS claim against Argentina made by a plaintiff whose ship
had been damaged in the Falklands War, allegedly in violation of inter-
national law. The Court disallowed the ATS claim, holding that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act194 (FSIA) is "the sole basis for ob-
taining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts."' 95 The FSIA lists
several exceptions to the rule of sovereign immunity, including excep-
tions for commercial activities, but it contains no exceptions for
violations of international law of the type alleged by the Amerada Hess
In addition, after-the-fact suppression of reporting could be viewed as strong inferential
evidence that the defendant state acquiesced in the torture at the time the torture was occur-
ring. It also implies that a state is benefiting from the torture. Based on such evidence, a
finder of fact could conclude the defendant was complicit.
Even if an after-the-fact defense is available, the defendant state would still be liable for
tortious interference with the freedom of information.
192. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
193. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
194. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1994).
195. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434.
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plaintiff. 19 6 The FSIA also contains no exceptions for human rights vio-
latior~s. By ruling in Amerada Hess that the FSIA does not include
exceptions for violations of international law, it appeared the Supreme
Court foreclosed the possibility that there may be a human rights ex-
ception to sovereign immunity.
After Amerada Hess, one law student Comment argued that viola-
tions of jus cogens should be considered an implied waiver to sovereign
immunity. 97 This approach was rejected, however, in Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina,"' in which the plaintiffs sued for torture
under the ATS. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the cleverness of the
student's argument, but held that Amerada Hess tolerated no derogation.
Jurisdiction is only available under the FSIA. The Act does not list vio-
lations of jus cogens as an exception to sovereign immunity, so
immunity may not be denied on that ground.' 99
Siderman has recently been reinforced by Princz v. Federal Repub-
lic of Germany,m° in which an American survivor of the Holocaust
sought damages from Germany."I A divided District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals granted sovereign immunity to the German
government, which deprived the court of jurisdiction, and the case was
dismissed. According to one commentator,
[f]or those wishing to sue foreign sovereigns in American
courts for human rights violations suffered abroad, Princz de-
stroyed whatever hopes were left after Amerada Hess and
Siderman .... On the one hand, the decision affirmed the princi-
ple that the FSIA is the exclusive jurisdictional basis in such suits
.... On the other hand, the case demonstrated that it is nearly im-
possible for plaintiffs successfully to invoke any of the FSIA's
exceptions.m
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994).
197. See Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Pro-
posed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77
CAL. L. REv. 365 (1989).
198. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
199. See id. at718-19.
200. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S.Ct. 923 (1995).
201. Princz was an American citizen living in Czechoslovakia in 1942 when he was ar-
rested and sent to Auschwitz. He was liberated in 1945, but because he was an American, he
was sent to an American army hospital and not to the Center for Displaced Persons like other
prisoners, and so was denied compensation paid to Holocaust survivors processed at the
Center. For an informative discussion of Princz and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see
Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403 (1995).
202. Id. at415.
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It appears that claims against foreign sovereigns will be possible
only if Congress amends the FSIA to include a human rights excep-
tion.2°3
Although governments may be protected by sovereign immunity,
there remains the possibility that parastatal telecommunications compa-
nies or their staff may be liable for tortious violations of the freedom of
information or the prohibition against torture.2 04 Telecommunications
companies could be implicated in these torts if they play any role in
cutting the reporting party's computer link to the Internet. They would
be guilty of complicity, for example, if some of their personnel accom-
pany police in raiding the reporter's home or office, and confiscate
telephones or other important hardware.
As long as there is no specific FSIA exception for human rights
violations, however, a claim against a state-owned telecommunications
company will still need to come within one of the existing FSIA excep-
tions. The commercial activity exception is probably the best option for
a plaintiff, but even this provision is unlikely to provide jurisdiction.
The exception provides jurisdiction where "the action is based upon...
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States.
205
A telecommunications company is engaged in commercial activity
elsewhere and transacts with all other countries of the world through its
international telephone lines. It must cooperate with the United States to
gain access for its customers to the U.S. telephone network, and to allow
U.S. customers to reach parties over its own network. A party reporting
on torture may use a computer network to exchange information with
interested groups in the U.S. Thus, any disruption of these communica-
tions by the parastatal telecom company would have a clear effect on
the U.S.: interested Americans could no longer receive information
from or communicate with the reporting party. The issue is whether
such a disruption rises to the level of "direct effect" in terms of the Im-
munity of Foreign States Act.
203. See id. at 415-18.
204. Who can be sued depends on whether the claimant relies on the ATS alone, or the
ATS and the TVPA. An ATS claim could be made against the company for tortious interfer-
ence with the freedom of information. Under the TVPA, however, the claim could only be
made against individual company personnel. The TVPA only holds individuals liable for
torture. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1998). According to the Senate Report, "[t]he legislation uses the
term 'individual' to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued.
Consequently, the TVPA is not meant to override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act...
which renders foreign governments immune from suits in U.S. courts, except in certain cir-
cumstances." S. RaP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
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As the law stands today, this is an open question. The FSIA gives no
guidance as to the meaning of "direct effect., 20 6 The Supreme Court in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover2w stated that "direct" does not need to
be "substantial" or "foreseeable", but needed to be more than "purely
trivial" and must follow "as an immediate consequence of the defen-
dant's activity. '208 The Supreme Court looked to the "minimal contacts"
test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington20 as "an aid in interpreting
the direct effect requirement ....,,210 A thorough analysis of the mini-
mal contacts test could fill several books; such a detailed discussion is
not appropriate here. Because precedent does not provide more guid-
ance, it suffices to note that the minimal contacts test is a fairly easy test
to satisfy. If courts interpret direct effect as the analog of minimal con-
tacts, the immunity exception may apply.
To make a direct effect argument, the plaintiff alleging either inter-
ference with the right to freedom of information or violation of the
prohibition on torture may argue that the direct effect is the severing of
communications between the receiving party in the U.S. and the report-
ing party abroad. This effect occurs as a direct result of the defendant's
disruption of Internet communication. Moreover, because there is a
causal connection between cutting communications and either of the
claims, the effect on the U.S. is an integral element of the tort claim.
Both claims are based on the defendant inhibiting cyberspace communi-
cations. In other words, if the line to the U.S. were not cut, Internet
communication would have continued, and a tort would not have oc-
curred. Both claims can arise only if the parastatal utility acts in a way
that directly effects the communications with the U.S.
Still, a plaintiff will almost certainly encounter substantial difficulty
in making such a claim. Previously, when confronted by more conven-
tional tort claims arising overseas, courts have been reluctant to apply
.. 211
the commercial exception. Claims arising out of Internet communica-
tions are certainly different from garden-variety torts, but the simple
fact that such claims are unusual will not be sufficient to bring them
206. Id.
207. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
208. Id. at 617-618.
209. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
210. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619, 619 n.2.
211. See, e.g., Anatares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1993)(tort claim arising from the detention of an aircraft overseas dismissed for failure to
show "direct effect" on the U.S.); Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1987)(financial loss resulting from personal injury suffered abroad is not a "direct effect" on
the U.S.); Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1987)(consequential
damages from personal injury abroad are insufficient to constitute a "direct effect" on the
U.S.). See also Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166.
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within the exception. Courts may be reluctant to apply the exception
to a fact situation which, undeniably, Congress did not consider when it
enacted the FSIA.2
B. The Act of State Doctrine and the Political Question Doctrine
Plaintiffs will also have to confront the act of state doctrine and the
political question doctrine. In Underhill v. Hernandez,214 the Supreme
Court explained that the act of state doctrine holds that U.S. courts may
not "sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another [country]
done within its own territory. ' 215 Subsequently, in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court decided that the doctrine dictates
that U.S. courts may not reach the merits of certain claims, even where
the conduct complained of violates international law.2" This raises the
212. As of this writing, no court in the United States has been confronted with an ATS
claim arising from cyberspace contacts with the United States.
213. A third class of defendants may soon be available to human rights claimants. In
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d. 232 (2d Cir. 1995), the plaintiff sued a leader of a Bosnian-Serb
faction in the former Yugoslavia, alleging he and his troops were responsible for systematic
human rights violations. The Second Circuit refused to dismiss the suit, holding that private
actors can be liable for violations of the law of nations, even if they are not acting on behalf
of a recognized government. Building on Kadic, some courts have indicated a willingness to
entertain claims against multinational corporations. In one pending suit, villagers from My-
anmar allege Unocal Corp. and Total S.A. colluded with the Myanmar military government
to relocate and enslave them as part of a pipeline construction project on the Thai border.
John Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
In all claims against multinationals, courts are consistently requiring a showing of state
action. Kadic held that some human rights violations, including torture, "are proscribed by
international law only when committed by state officials or under color of law." Kadic 70
F.3d at 243 (citing Convention Against Torture Art. 1). Citing Kadic, one court dismissed
murder and torture claims against a corporation operating in Indonesia, holding that private
actors can only be liable for such crimes if they act under color of law. Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997). The court relied on the jurisprudence of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the test in the Restatement § 207 to determine whether state action was
present. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374.
Nevertheless, human rights advocates are undaunted and promise to bring more suits
against corporations in the future. Jennifer M. Green, a staff attorney with the Center for
Constitutional Rights who is involved with the Unocal case, argues that it is now
"established firmly" in the Second Circuit that private actors such as corporations can be
held liable for human rights violations just like states. She hopes that the threat of lawsuits
might force companies to work to curb human rights abuses. Dominic Bencivenga, Suits
Attempt to Extend Liability to Corporations, 218 N.Y.L.J. 46, Sept. 4, 1997, at 6. "If sheer
morality doesn't do it, maybe hitting the pocketbook of companies will make a difference,"
says Green. Id. at 5.
The ultimate effect of these cases on human rights advocacy remains to be seen. As the
law develops, parastatals and multinationals may become increasingly vulnerable to ATS
claims, providing plaintiffs with a new range of litigation options.
214. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
215. Id. at 252.
216. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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possibility that claims based on international human rights law could be
dismissed under the act of state doctrine.217
To date, ATS plaintiffs have not been barred from recovery by the
act of state doctrine. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, Judge Kaufman ex-
pressed doubt in dicta whether acts in violation of the Constitution and
the laws of the Republic of Paraguay can be properly characterized as
218
acts of state. Subsequent case law has followed Filartiga, and found
the act of state doctrine inapplicable to violations of the law of nations.
The legislative history of the TVPA indicates that this doctrine
should not bar TVPA claims. In reporting on the Act, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee expressed its belief that "because no state officially
condones torture or extrajudicial killings, few such acts, if any, would
fall under the rubric of 'official actions .... ,,2'9 According to this
analysis, the act of state doctrine should not bar an ATS claim for tor-
tious interference with the freedom of information regarding torture,
since states presumably do not condone that either. However, the ques-
tion remains ambiguous. Until Congress speaks definitively on the issue
it remains possible that claims raised under the ATS, and perhaps the
TVPA, may be dismissed on these grounds.220
The political question doctrine is another open question for plain-
tiffs. The doctrine prevents the judicial branch from deciding issues
textually committed to the legislative or executive branches. 221 In Baker
v. Carr,222 the Supreme Court pointed out that "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance." 223 One view holds that the political question doc-
trine can bar ATS claims,2 4 but this remains a minority position. In fact,
a handful of recent cases have rejected attempts to dismiss tort actions
on grounds of the doctrine.2 Nevertheless, as with the act of state doc-
trine, it would be comforting if Congress would settle this question.
217. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Reimann, supra note 201, at 427-31.
218. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980).
219. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 8 (1991).
220. See also Reimann, supra note 201, at 430 (urging legislative clarification of the
applicability of the act of state doctrine to human rights claims).




224. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Robb, J., concurring) (dismissing ATS claim on grounds of the political question doctrine).
225. See, e.g., Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 at 336-337, (1lth Cir. 1992); Von
Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialst Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 257-259 (D.D.C. 1985);
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d. 844, 847-848 (1lth Cir. 1996).
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CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
While interference with Internet reports on torture clearly violates
the law of nations for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute, plaintiffs will
nevertheless face an uphill battle in making their claims. U.S. and inter-
national law establish the basis for plaintiffs' claims of aiding and
abetting torture, but Congress should amend the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act to establish an unambiguous cause of action for interference
with the right to freedom of information regarding torture. No change
needs to be made in the choice of law rules if U.S. courts follow the Fi-
lartiga approach, because they can apply the lex delicti except where
necessary to properly reflect the international censure against torture.
Such an approach is entirely consistent with the law of nations and the
law of the United States. Even if the causes of action are clearly estab-
lished, plaintiffs will still face the act of state doctrine and the political
question doctrine. Congress should explicitly take these into account in
any of its enactments.
The greatest hurdles for plaintiffs, however, are the limited excep-
tions to sovereign immunity provided under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.226 Congress must extend these exceptions to cover vio-
lations of the prohibition on torture. Such an extension was proposed as
part of counterterrorism legislation introduced in response to the Okla-
homa City bombing of 1995. The House version of the Bill denied
sovereign immunity where "money damages are sought against a for-
eign state" for torture and other acts, "or the provision of material
support" for such acts, where the act or provision of support "is engaged
in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or her office . ... The immunity exception
was to be available in suits by any "national of the United States,"2 and•^ 229
thus immunity would still be available in ATS suits by alien plaintiffs.
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1994).
227. Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 2703, 104th Cong. § 803
(1995)(proposing to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1605).
228. Id.
229. In discussing the jurisdictional provision in one version of the bill, the House Ju-
diciary Committee stated that "[i]t is expected that a lawsuit proceeding under this section
will be brought either by the victim, or on behalf of the victim's estate in the case of death or
mental incapacity." H.R. REP. No. 104-383 at 105 (1996). The House Bill explicitly adopted
the Immigration and Nationality Act's definition of "national of the United States," Compre-
hensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 2703, 104th Cong. § 803 (1995)(proposing to
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1605), which includes anyone who is "a citizen of the United States" or
who "owes permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1994). This
definitional language was retained in the legislation as it was eventually enacted, Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214,
1241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1605, 1610(a) (West Supp. 1998)), leaving
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The House Bill also offered the prospect of suing a "deep-pocket" de-
fendant.20 The original Senate Bill did not contain this language and
denied sovereign immunity only to nations designated as state sponsors
of terrorism.23
The Conference Report retained these provisions from both the
House and Senate Bills22, and the law as enacted thus contained the
Senate's limited exception of immunity for only state sponsors of ter-
rorism.2 3 This means that from the time the bill was enacted, claims can
be filed against only five countries: Iran, Cuba, Iraq, Syria, and North
Korea.2m All other states continue to enjoy full immunity. Further
amendments are needed if deserving plaintiffs are to prevail in court.
Congress has taken a step in the right direction by depriving some states
of immunity where they commit or are complicit in torture, but all
countries should be denied immunity.
The growth of computer technology and the resulting upsurge in
international Internet communications present new challenges to human
rights advocates as the Twentieth Century draws to a close, but it also
presents new opportunities. With the passage of the TVPA in 1992
Congress committed itself to redressing the injuries of persons subjected
to torture, and added another weapon to the arsenal deployed against
perpetrators of torture. Congress should act now to ensure that U.S.
courts remain able to respond to acts that violate customary interna-
tional law, despite the new and unexpected ways in which these acts
may be carried out.
open the possibility that claims could be filed by naturalized U.S. citizens on behalf of for-
eign relatives.
230. Under the current law, defendants are frequently judgment proof, see'infra p. 29,
but the House Bill permitted recovery against the assets of a foreign state. Comprehensive
Antiterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 2703, 104th Cong. § 803 (1995)(proposing to amend 28
U.S.C. § 1610(a) to deny a foreign state immunity from attachment where sovereign immu-
nity is denied under the exceptions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).
231. Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong § 205
(1995)(proposing to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1605)(citations omitted).
232. H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 29-30 (1996).
233. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1605, 1610(a) (West
Supp. 1998)).
234. See Bureau of Export Administation, Special Country Policies and Provisions, 15
C.F.R. § 785 (1995).
